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TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY TRADE GOVERNANCE: FINDINGS FROM THE
COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES
SANGEETA KHORANA and INMACULADA MARTÍNEZ-ZARZOSO
This paper focuses on twenty-first-century-trade governance patterns within the
Commonwealth (CW) countries. It uses an augmented gravity model to examine the
role of governance in influencing trade and investment flows, and whether enhanced
trade governance within the CW countries could potentially foster trade gains, on a both
intra- and extra-CW basis. Results show a 10% reduction in the costs incurred for a good
to exit a country can increase intra-CW exports by 5%. Second, contract enforcement
is more efficient among CW members, and requires 20% less time compared to the
world average. Third, every 1 percentage point improvement in government effectiveness
triggers an increase in exports from CW, at 3.4%, compared to the rest of the world, at
2.4%. Finally, trade between CW members is three times higher when they belong to an
existing regional trade agreement (F10, 011, F13).
I. INTRODUCTION
The role of institutions and governance as a
driver of international trade has attracted wide
academic scrutiny (Bilgin, Giray, and Chi Keung
2017; Francois and Manchin 2013; Linders
et al. 2005). Evidence suggests that institutions
matter for countries’ economic performance
and that weak or inadequate institutions restrain
trade in magnitudes not dissimilar to those
related to the introduction of tariffs (Acemoglu,
Johnson, and Robinson 2002, 2005; Ander-
son and Marcouiller 2002). Studies find that
specific institutional dimensions impact trade
flows (Martínez-Zarzoso and Marquez-Ramos
2019). For example, strong institutions, both
formal (e.g., laws, rules, and organizations) and
informal (e.g., trust, individual habits, values,
group routines, and social norms) facilitate trade
(Yu, Beugelsdijk, and de Haan 2015). Corporate
governance, employment protection, investor
protection, and political environments impact on
countries’ exporting performance (Bilgin, Giray,
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and Chi Keung 2017). There is also a link
between institutions, social governance, and
political risk and these variables determine for-
eign direct investment (FDI) flows (Benácˇek
et al. 2014).
Recent work suggests that streamlining trade
governance and procedures could unleash eco-
nomic opportunities and enable countries to
harness the “Commonwealth Advantage” (Arvis
et al. 2013; Commonwealth Trade Review 2018).
A review of literature reveals none of the stud-
ies examine the impact of institutional quality
on the value and direction of trade for the 53
Commonwealth (CW) members, despite their
growing role in international trade (Common-
wealth Secretariat 2015). This paper fills in the
missing gap and examines the role of governance
in influencing trade and investment flows in the
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CW. It explores whether enhanced trade gover-
nance within the CW countries could potentially
foster trade gains, on a both intra- and extra-CW
basis. The specific research questions this paper
focuses on are: first, what is the distinction
between the “trade governance” and “good gov-
ernance” agendas? Second, what indicators exist
for measuring trade governance and how its use
can foster trade gains for the CW countries?
Third, what policies can promote trade gover-
nance and enhance the CW Advantage—that is,
higher intra-CW trade and investment and lower
trade costs.
This paper uses an augmented gravity model
of trade to examine whether an improvement
in trade governance indicators lead to higher
exports from and between CW countries. We
also examine the relationship between CW
countries’ exports and FDI, intellectual prop-
erty rights (IPRs) and logistics performance
indicators. Given “defining institutions is noto-
riously difficult and the current literature on the
topic does not agree on a common definition”
(Rodríguez-Pose 2013), we draw on data from
the World Governance Indicators (WGIs) elabo-
rated by theWorld Bank (Kaufmann et al., 2010),
the Logistics Performance Index (LPI) and Doing
Business from the World Bank. We also use FDI
flows data from the United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), and
IPR payments and receipts from the World Bank
World Development Indicators (WDIs).
The contributions of our paper to the related
literature are twofold. First, to the best of our
knowledge, this is the first paper that empirically
investigates effects of traditional gravity, insti-
tutional, and political quality variables as fac-
tors determining the drivers of bilateral trade
flows between the 53 CW countries. Second, the
gravity model of trade estimates both intra-CW
trade flows and CW exports to all destinations.
The methodology enables us to identify inter-
connections between trade and trade governance
while dealing with identification issues by using
panel data.
Results provide evidence of a positive correla-
tion between CW countries’ exports and foreign
direct investment flows, IPRs and trade facilita-
tion variables. Main findings include: first, con-
tract enforcement is more efficient among CW
members, in general, and requires 20% less time
compared to the world average. Second, a 10%
reduction in the costs incurred for a good to
exit a country can increase intra-CW exports by
5%. Third, every 1 percentage point improvement
in government effectiveness triggers a greater
increase in exports from CW traders, at 3.4%,
compared to the rest of the world, at 2.4%.
Finally, trade between CWmembers is more than
three times higher when they belong to an exist-
ing regional trade agreement (RTA), highlighting
the importance of effective regional integration
for boosting the CW advantage.
The paper is organized as follows: Section
II contextualizes trade governance, and exam-
ines existing literature to understand the role of
trade governance within the context of CW coun-
tries. Section III presents the augmented gravity
modeling framework used to examine the role
of trade governance on export flows. Section IV
presents the results on whether enhanced trade
governance within the CW countries could foster
gains, and how this can improve understanding of
the “Commonwealth Advantage.” Section V con-
cludes and suggests recommendations to enhance
intra-CW trade.
II. TRADE GOVERNANCE: LITERATURE REVIEW
Governance is a broad concept that has
gained significance in the world trading land-
scape (Khorana, McGuire, and Perdikis 2014).
It comprises the mechanisms, processes, and
institutions through which decisions are made
and authority in a country is exercised. The
important elements of governance include: the
political institutions of a society (the process of
government selection), state capacity (capacity
of the government to implement policies), and
regulation of economic institutions (the formal
state institutions that enact and enforce the laws)
(Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2005).
Sharma (2010) defines “trade governance”
as “consisting of institutions and organisational
structures that determine the formulation and
enforcement of rules and the associated negoti-
ations over policies.” Literature highlights two
major forms of trade governance: regional and
global (Li 2003; Sharma 2010, 2013). Studies
suggest that global trade governance, as embod-
ied in the erstwhile General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade and the present World Trade Organi-
zation (WTO), is characterized as a rule-based
system (Bagwell and Staiger 1999, 2002; Jack-
son 1989; Keohane 1984; Khorana, McGuire,
and Perdikis 2014; Mayer 1981). At the regional
level, the evolution of trade governance under
RTAs changed the focus of trade governance
from traditional reduction of tariffs to broad-
based commitments, and this approach addresses
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the quality of institutions and promotes partic-
ipatory approaches. The emphasis in this form
of trade governance includes deep commitments
on investment, procurement, competition pol-
icy, and IPR issues characterized by participa-
tory and consensus-oriented accountability and
transparency. The difference between global and
regional trade governance is fundamental in that
the former is largely rules-based, whereas the lat-
ter can be characterized as relationship-based that
provides for a degree of flexibility in the incorpo-
ration of rules (Sharma 2010).
Literature examines a number of trade gov-
ernance indicators. Hamanaka, Tafgar, and Ico
(2015) construct an indicator of trade governance
(proxied by quality of trade statistics at the two-
digit level) for 159 countries and global rank-
ings with G-20 economies. The study concludes
that trade governance is influenced by “factors
outside the confines of trade governance issues,”
which include the efficiency and soundness of
government policy, especially customs. Others
(see Behar 2010; Brewer, Choi, andWalker 2007;
Langbein and Knack 2010) use the LPIs and
WGIs to examine and test the level of consistency
among indicators. While some report a posi-
tive relationship between trade openness and cor-
ruption, others focus on country-specific studies
to test the significance of experience-based cor-
ruption in explaining corruption indices (Kurtz
and Schrank 2007; Razafindrakoto and Roubaud
2005; Treisman 2007).
There is mixed evidence on the relationship
between governance indicators and economic
performance, and how this affects countries’ eco-
nomic performance. But none of the existing
studies examine the relationship between gover-
nance indicators and trade from the perspective of
CW countries. Results show that the relationship
with development varies across the dimensions of
governance and the stage of a country’s devel-
opment. Studies broadly examine the connec-
tions between governance, economic growth, and
inequality (Zhuang, de Dios, and Lagman-Martin
2010) and report a positive and robust relation-
ship between democratic governance variables,
economic growth, and income levels (Gerring
et al. 2005; Persson and Tabellini 2006). Han,
Khan, and Zhuang (2014) find a positive relation-
ship such that government effectiveness, politi-
cal stability, control of corruption, and regula-
tory quality have a significantly greater impact
on growth performance compared with voice
and accountability and rule of law. This study
reports that governance matters for development,
and that better governance correlates with faster
growth and higher income levels. Al-Marhubi
(2004) investigates the determinants of gover-
nance and reports that countries with a history
of Western European influence and with British
common law origins have better governance.
Studies highlight that the quality of institu-
tions is a necessary condition and an important
determinant of effective trade governance (Aron
2000) but this neither refers to nor applies to
the CW countries. Busse et al. (2007) use trade
governance indicators and report that the qual-
ity of institutions is an important determinant of
economic growth and income levels. Busse et al.
identify three channels that contribute to positive
linkages between trade and institutions, and sug-
gest that trade influences institutions from a gov-
ernance perspective. Busse and Hefeker (2007)
examine the effect of governance indicators on
FDI, and show that government stability, absence
of internal and external conflicts, low presence
of corruption and ethnic tensions, law and order,
democratic accountability of the government, and
high quality of the bureaucracy are highly signif-
icant determinants of FDI inflows.
The academic debate has focused on the effec-
tiveness of governance and regional trade (see
Bagwell and Staiger 2002; Cooley and Spruyt
2009; Sharma 2010). Studies report that the
regional governance mode, if designed in accor-
dance with membership characteristics and prior-
ities, is likely to facilitate the exploitation of key
advantages of trade governance systems, though
these do not explicitly touch on the CW group of
countries. Sharma (2013) concludes that regional
trade governance leads to innovation of rules and
other governance mechanisms, and negotiations
generally involve a wider set of issues that are
important to negotiating partners, which allows
for more effective discussion and enforcement of
resulting agreements.
More recently, Berden, Bergstrand, and Etten
(2014) used WGIs to estimate the effects of gov-
ernance on trade and FDI using a state-of-the-art
gravity model. Their data is restricted to 1997 to
2004 and includes 28 OECD countries as source
countries and 124 potential destination countries.
They find voice and accountability in the import-
ing countries is negatively related to exports, but
there exists a positive and statistically signifi-
cant effect for the other five WGI variables indi-
vidually. In a similar setting, Martínez-Zarzoso
and Marquez-Ramos (2019) focus on the Mid-
dle East and North Africa (MENA) countries and
compare the effects with other regions in the
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world economy. The main results show that each
of the six governance indicators in the export-
ing and the importing countries considered has
a positive effect on bilateral trade. However, the
results for MENA exporters differ slightly. Gov-
ernance in the importing countries seems to be
less relevant for MENA exporters than for other
exporters. Increasing country-pair similarity in
governance indicators—in terms of the levels
of regulatory quality and the rule of law in the
exporting and importing countries—favors the
exports of MENA countries. Meanwhile, simi-
larities in voice and accountability also foster
exports for the average exporter, but it does not
seem relevant for MENA exporters.
III. TRADE GOVERNANCE INDICATORS: DATA AND
METHODOLOGY
The indicators employed are from the WGIs,
the LPI and Doing Business obtained from the
World Bank database, complemented with FDI
information from UNCTAD and IPR payments
and receipts from the WDI.
A. Indicators
World Governance Indicators. The WGIs, con-
structed by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi
(2005) for the World Bank, are normalized onto
a 0–100 scale (as in Berden, Bergstrand, and
Etten 2014 and Martínez-Zarzoso and Marquez-
Ramos 2019). The six aggregate indicators are
based on 31 data sources that report the per-
ceptions of survey respondents and assessments
worldwide. Each indicator (below) represents a
different dimension of governance:
1. Voice and accountability measures the
extent to which a country’s citizens are able to
participate in selecting their government, as well
as the freedoms of expression, association, and
the media. This variable best captures most indi-
viduals’ notions of how a democratic institution
fosters voice and accountability.
2. Political stabilitymeasures the perceptions
of the likelihood that a government will not be
destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or
violent means.
3. Government effectiveness measures the
quality of public services, the civil service (and
its degree of independence), the policy forma-
tion, and implementation process and the overall
commitment to implementing policies.
4. Regulatory quality indicates the ability
of the government to formulate and implement
sound policies and regulations that permit and
promote private sector development.
5. Rule of law measures the extent to which
agents have confidence in and abide by the rules
of society, with particular emphasis on the qual-
ity of contract enforcement, the police, and the
courts.
6. Control of corruption measures the extent
to which public power is not exercised for private
gain, including both petty and grand forms of
corruption as well as the extent of “capture” by
elites and private interests.
Relevant literature substantiates that institu-
tions and exports can directly affect the willing-
ness of agents to trade abroad and impact on
economic variables that may in turn affect the
propensity of agents to trade (Méon and Sekkat
2004; Nunn and Trefler 2014). This suggests
that, on one hand, an improvement in the gover-
nance indicators of CW countries may increase
exports and lead to a facilitative business envi-
ronment, thereby facilitating trade and the “Com-
monwealth Advantage.” On the other hand, an
improvement in governance indicators may affect
countries’ comparative and competitive advan-
tage, as well as existing trade relationships, with
an ambiguous effect on exports. Within this con-
text, this paper tests whether improved gover-
nance indicators result in an increase in exports
from and between the CW countries.
Foreign Direct Investment. The literature pro-
vides ample evidence on the trade and FDI (out-
ward and inward) relationship. Studies report-
ing on the FDI–trade nexus suggest that foreign-
invested firms import intermediate inputs for final
production in the host country and export fin-
ished goods back to the FDI home country or
to third-country markets (Cuyvers et al. 2008;
Wei and Liu 2001). Using bilateral panel data
for 1984–1998 on China and 19 regions, Liu,
Wang, and Wei (2001) examine the causal rela-
tionship between inward FDI and international
trade and show that China’s import growth led to
inward FDI growth from a home country/region,
which in turn increased Chinese exports to the
home country/region, which in turn led to import
growth. Using cross-sectional firm-level data,
Lipsey and Weiss (1981) report a positive rela-
tionship between the output of U.S. firms in for-
eign subsidiaries and the firms’ exports from
the United States to these subsidiaries. In other
words, a higher level of output by a U.S. firm
leads to higher firms’ exports from the United
States. Min (2003) also shows positive effects
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of FDI (on Malaysia’s exports), using industry-
specific and FDI-investing country data.
Studies examine whether FDI and trade are
substitutes or complements (see Liu, Wang,
and Wei 2001; Wei and Liu 2001). Although
traditional economic theory assumes that trade
and FDI are substitutes (Mundell 1957), trade
and FDI can be complements under certain
assumptions (e.g., Schmitz and Helmberger
1970). Empirical evidence from regions world-
wide highlights the existence of complementary
effects between FDI and exports (Egger 2001;
Brouwer, Paap, and Viaene 2008; Cheung and
Qian 2009; Chen, Hsu, and Wang 2012).
Brouwer, Paap, and Viaene (2008) estimate
gravity models of trade and FDI for a sample
of 28 European countries over 1990–2004. The
study reports a positive and significant correla-
tion between bilateral FDI and trade, when FDI
is included as an explanatory variable in the grav-
ity model. Egger (2001) obtains similar results
for 1988–1996. Chen, Hsu, and Wang (2012)
also analyze the relationship between outward
FDI and exports, for 15 Taiwanesemanufacturing
industries over 1991–2007. The results, obtained
using random and fixed effects estimators, con-
firm complementarity between FDI and exports.
Finally, Cheung and Qian (2009) also report a
positive relationship and observe that this gets
stronger when the host countries are develop-
ing economies.
Intellectual Property Rights. IPRs are a set of
national laws and rules that protect the economic
value of patents, copyrights, and trademarks to
offer incentives for the production of knowledge.
The WDI collect information on charges for the
use of intellectual property such as payments and
receipts between residents and nonresidents for
the authorized use of patents, trademarks, copy-
rights, industrial processes, and designs including
trade secrets and franchises. It also collects such
information for produced originals or prototypes
(such as copyrights on books and manuscripts,
computer software, cinematographic works, and
sound recordings) through licensing agreements,
and related rights (such as for live performances
and television, cable, or satellite broadcast).
Literature on IPR regimes reports that, from a
static welfare perspective, the destination coun-
try loses from protection but the source coun-
try benefits (Deardorff 1991; Helpman 1993).
However, from a dynamic point of view, an IPR
regime stimulates innovation in the source coun-
try and fosters trade, benefiting both the trading
partners, but the benefits are reaped as long as
the social return on innovation exceeds private
returns (Diwan and Rodrik 1991).
This paper uses IPR payments and recipients,
the number of patent applications as the sum of
foreign and domestic patent applications and the
total number of trademark applications reported
in the WDI. Given that IPRs are territorial, any
differences in the national regulations and norms
on IPR protection can distort international trade
patterns. It is in this context that harmonization
of IPR rules is likely to have a positive effect
on trade.
Logistics Performance Indicators. The LPI is
an overall metric of supply chain efficiency that
lists information on where a country is in terms
of logistics and provides a broad indication of
the problem areas. Covering 160 countries (in
LPI 2014), the index is constructed from over
5,000 country assessments by more than 1,000
freight forwarders and logistics professionals
worldwide. The respondents rate the logistics
performance of their country and eight other
countries on a scale of 1–5.
The LPI is published every 2 years and cov-
ers 2007, 2010, 2012, 2014, and 2016. Studies
examining the LPI–trade nexus suggest that the
LPI has a significant impact in terms of raising
awareness and pushing for comprehensive “con-
nectivity” and logistics policies, as reported in
the case of the Indonesia, Kazakhstan, the EU,
and Asia-Pacific Economic cooperation mem-
bers. The 2007–2016 LPI report suggests that
the gap between the “best” and the “worst” logis-
tics performers is narrowing slowly, confirming
that, although a country’s level of development
plays an important role, logistics performance
policies do matter. An example is Indonesia—an
overperforming country in terms of the LPI that
has initiated reforms to improve national logis-
tics efficiency. In terms of trade facilitation, the
customs in the country show an improvement but
the other border control agencies still lag. Sub-
sequent LPI reports also highlight that the main
challenge is the initiation of reforms in more than
one area in line with the needs of the country.
Moreover, a number of studies for specific groups
of countries have shown that improvements in
logistic performance boosts trade and compet-
itiveness in Spain (Bensassi et al. (2015) and
emerging economies (Martí and Puertas 2017)).
Doing Business Indicators. Doing Business
data provide objective measures of business
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regulations and enforcement across 190
economies and selected cities at the subna-
tional and regional level. They capture several
dimensions of the regulatory environment and
measure the regulations that apply to firms
through their life cycle. The data are based on
a detailed reading of domestic laws and regula-
tions as well as administrative requirements. The
information is collected through several rounds
of communication with expert respondents (both
private sector practitioners and government
officials), questionnaires, conference calls, writ-
ten correspondence, and visits by the team.
Doing Business relies on four main sources of
information: the relevant laws and regulations,
Doing Business respondents, the governments of
the economies covered and World Bank Group
regional staff.
Here, the first indicator this paper uses is trade
facilitation, accessing variables from the Doing
Business database that measure the time and
cost (excluding tariffs) associated with three sets
of procedures—documentary compliance, bor-
der compliance, and domestic transport—within
the overall process of exporting or importing a
shipment of goods. Studies assessing the impact
of trade facilitation on trade use different def-
initions of trade facilitation. For example, Wil-
son, Mann, and Otsuki (2003, 2005) consider a
broad definition, and quantify the impact of four
different measures: port efficiency, customs envi-
ronment, regulatory environment, and e-business
usage. Engman (2005) uses the WTO definition,
which includes simplification and harmonization
of international trade procedures, and takes into
account what happens around borders. Wilson,
Mann, and Otsuki (2003, 2005) also focus on the
effects of single measures of trade facilitation,
such as information technology, port efficiency,
and institution quality.
Studies use the gravity model of trade aug-
mented with “trade facilitation” variables.
Examples include Wilson, Mann, and Otsuki
(2003, 2005), who examine the trade facili-
tation variables for a sample of countries in
the Asia-Pacific region. Soloaga, Wilson, and
Mejía (2006) focus on Mexican competitive-
ness. Djankov, Fruend, and Pham (2010) use
the World Bank’s Doing Business database but
focus only on the effects of time delays in the
exporting country. Nordas, Pinali, and Grosso
(2006) examine how time delays affect proba-
bility to export and export volumes for imports
from Japan, Australia, and the United Kingdom.
Persson (2007) studies the effect of time delays
and transaction costs on trade flows using a
sample selection approach and focuses on the
specific effects for each of the six groups of
African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries nego-
tiating economic partnership agreements with
the EU. Martínez-Zarzoso and Márquez-Ramos
(2008) analyze the effect of trade facilitation on
trade volumes at a disaggregated level and focus
on the simplification of “border procedures.”
The second indicator used is contract enforce-
ment. On this, the Doing Business database
records the time and cost associated with the
logistical process of exporting and importing
goods. For instance, the indicator measures the
time and cost of resolving a commercial dispute
through a local first-instance court and the qual-
ity of the judicial processes index, evaluating
whether each economy has adopted a series
of good practices that promote quality and effi-
ciency in the court system. The most recent round
of data, collected in June 2017, comes from the
study of codes of civil procedure and other court
regulations, as well as questionnaires completed
by local litigation lawyers and judges. The
ranking of economies on the ease of enforcing
contracts is determined by sorting their distance
to frontier scores for enforcing contracts.
A review of the literature brings up studies
that examine how contract enforcement affects
the volume of international trade. For example,
Anderson and Marcouiller (2002) test for the
implications of contract enforcement for the vol-
ume of trade but do not make a distinction
between different types of goods. Ranjan and Lee
(2007) do makes this distinction, estimating a
gravity-type equation for trade in different classes
of goods and measuring how contract enforce-
ment affects the volume of trade. They conclude
that the impact is larger for differentiated goods.
B. Data and Methodology
Data. The databases used to construct the
explanatory variables for the regression analysis
are:
• The WGIs on governance—that is, voice
and accountability, political stability, government
effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and
control of corruption;
• The WDI on IPR payments and recipients,
the number of patent applications as the sum of
foreign and domestic patent applications, and the
total number of trademarks applications;
• UNCTAD data on FDI inflows and out-
flows;
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• The LPI database on number of days to
export, cost to export a container, and documents
required to export/import;
• The Doing Business database on trade
facilitation and contract enforcement.
Data from the WGIs are for 1998–2013.
FDI data from UNCTAD are for 1996–2013.
IPR data from the WDI is for 1996–2003, and
we use a proxy for the level of protection in
any given country. Contract enforcement and
trade facilitation indicators are for 2007–2016.1
Bilateral trade data from UNCTAD are for
1996–2013.
Methodology. In line with recent empirical stud-
ies that investigate the determinants of bilateral
trade flows (Head and Mayer 2014), our model-
ing framework uses the gravity model of trade.
The rationale for the selection of the gravity
framework is that it provides a good statistical fit
for most datasets and can be extended with pol-
icy variables.2 We augment a gravity model for
aggregated exports with governance indicators to
determine the role of governance in trade flows.
We hypothesize that each governance indicator
has an impact on trade.
The model in its basic form assumes that trade
between countries is directly related to a coun-
try’s size and inversely to the distance between
them. Exports from country i to country j, Xij,
are explained by the economic size (i.e., gross
domestic product, GDP), direct geographical dis-
tance, and a set of dummies that include com-
mon characteristics such as common language,
common border, or colonial relationships. The
specification of the gravity model of trade in its
original multiplicative form for a single year is
given by:
(1) Xij = β0GDP
β1
i GDP
β2
i DIST
β3
ij A
β4
ij uij
where GDPi (GDPj) indicates the GDP of the
exporter (importer),
1. This paper uses data from 2007 even though data from
2004 are available, as these are not comparable over time
owing to changes in the data collection methodology. The
contract enforcement regulation index consists of the follow-
ing subcomponents: number of procedures in a court case
involving bridging a contract and time in calendar days to
resolve the dispute. The trade facilitation index uses number
of days (documents) to import and export and overland trans-
port costs.
2. For a review of the literature using gravity models
applied to trade flows, see Anderson and Yotov (2010).
DISTij measures the distance between the two
countries’ capitals (or economic centers).
A high level of income in the exporting coun-
try indicates a high level of production, which
increases the availability of goods for exports.
Therefore, β1 is expected to be positive. The coef-
ficient of Yj, β2, is also expected to be positive
since a high level of income in the importing
country suggests higher imports. The distance
coefficient is expected to be negative since it is
a proxy of all possible trade cost sources. Aij
represents any other factors aiding or prevent-
ing trade between pairs of countries and uij is
the error term. Usually, Aij includes dummy vari-
ables for trading partners sharing a common lan-
guage, colonial ties, and a common border, as
well as trading bloc dummy variables that eval-
uate the effects of preferential trade agreements.
The coefficients of all these bilateral variables are
expected to be positive.
When the gravity model of trade is estimated
using panel data, a time dimension is incorpo-
rated into the model. For estimation purposes,
Equation (1), in log-linear form, is augmented
with governance indicators and with the time
dimension, and written as:
lnXijt = β0 + β1lnGDPit + β2lnGDPjt
(2)
+ β3PClnGDPit + β4lnPCGDPjt + β5lnAreai
+ β6lnAreaj + β7LANDLi + β8LANDLj
+ β9(lnDISTij) + β10(CONTIGij)
+ β11(COMLANGij) + β12(COLONYij)
+ β13RTAijt + β14WTOijt + β15VAit
+ β16PSit + β17GEit + β18RQit
+ β19RLit + β20CCit + β21VAjt
+ β22PSjt + β23GEjt + β24RQjt
+ β25RLjt + β26CCjt + δt + εijt
where the variables are as follows:
• lnGDPit and lnGDPjt are as defined above;
• lnPCGDPit and lnPCGDPjt are the GDP
per capita of an exporter (importer);
• lnAreai and lnAreaj are the area of the cor-
responding country in square kilometers;
• lnLANDLi and lnLANDLj are dummy vari-
ables that take the value of 1 if the country i (j) is
landlocked;
• DISTijis the bilateral distance between the
economic centres of i and j;
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• CONTIGij is a dummy variable assuming a
value of 1 if the two countries share a common
land border (and 0 otherwise);
• COMLANGij is a dummy variable that takes
a value of 1 if the two countries share a common
language;
• COLONYij is a dummy variable that takes
the value of 1 when countries i and j have ever
had a colonial relationship, and 0 otherwise;
• RTAijt takes the value of 1 if countries i
and j belong to the same regional integration
agreement;
• WTOijt takes the value of 1 if countries i and
j are members of the WTO in year t.
The other variables include the six measures
of the WGI from the World Bank:
• Voice and accountability (VA);
• Political stability (PS);
• Government effectiveness (GE);
• Regulatory quality (RQ);
• Rule of law (RL);
• Control of corruption (CC).
Each variable is specified in the model 2 with
the subscripts it or jt denoting that these vary
by exporter-and-time or importer-and-time. As in
Berden, Bergstrand, and Etten (2014), we stan-
dardize theWGI variables to range between 0 and
100 to aid interpretation of the results.
• RTA: As a proxy for regional governance, a
dummy variable is used that takes the value of 1
when a pair of countries has an RTA in a given
year, and 0 otherwise.
• WTO: As a proxy for global governance,
we use a dummy variable that takes the value of
1 if a pair of trading countries both belong to the
WTO, and 0 otherwise.
The model tests how the RTA and WTO
“effects” vary for CW countries and for intra-
CW trade (i.e., all countries within the CW
group) in comparison with non-CW countries to
examine how and if there is an impact on the
CW Advantage.
A similar comparison and analysis is carried
out for the WGIs and for the FDI, IPR, LPI, and
Doing Business indicators.
Gravity model literature proposes the inclu-
sion of multilateral resistance terms to control
for third-country price effects that can be mod-
eled with time invariant origin and destination
fixed effects in addition to time dummies.
Additionally, instead of the bilateral gravity
variables, origin–destination-fixed effects can
be added to fully control for the endogeneity
of the RTA variable (Head and Mayer 2014;
Yotov et al. 2016).3
IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
A. Governance Indicators and Trade
Table 1 presents the results of the gravity
model augmented with governance indicators
from the WGI. The model is estimated for: All
Countries—that is, CW and non-CW countries
(column 1); CW countries—that is, countries
exporting to any other country (column 2); Intra-
CW trade flows—that is, countries from within
the CW group (column 3) for 1998–2013.
Column 1 (Table 1) shows that an increase
in the GDP of exporting and importing coun-
tries increases trade flows, and the coefficients
are close to the unitary theoretically expected
magnitude. Distance has an expected negative
and significant effect on exports, while common
language, common border, and colonial links
positively affect exports. The income elastic-
ities of CW exporters and intra-CW trade are
slightly lower than the elasticity of all exporters,
and income per capita shows a positive coeffi-
cient, indicating that higher income levels foster
CW exports. With regard to the common lan-
guage effect, it is slightly higher for the whole
sample, whereas common colony shows a non-
significant relationship for CW countries. RTA
and WTO membership dummies also present
the expected positive effect on exports. The
results for the gravity variables, however, vary
when the sample of exporters is restricted to
CW exporting countries, as seen in column 2,
and to intra-CW trade flows in column 3 of
Table 1.
The RTA effect is positive and statistically
significant in all three columns, but the magni-
tude varies substantially. In particular, exports
are 115% higher to a country’s trading part-
ners when there is a common RTA, compared
with exports to countries outside the RTA. The
results also show that the CW exporters trade
twice as much as a result of the RTA effect
([exp(1.193)-1]*100 = 230% increase) and intra-
CW trade is three times higher between countries
with RTAs than between countries outside any
3. In our setting, we do not include origin–destination
fixed effects because this will prevent us from estimating the
Commonwealth effect, which is time invariant.
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TABLE 1
Exports and Governance
Dep. Var: ln X (1) (2) (3)
Exp. Variables All CW_EXP Intra_CW
Ln GDP exporter 1.352*** 1.315*** 1.244***
[0.0118] [0.0203] [0.0374]
Ln GDP importer 0.939*** 0.885*** 0.867***
[0.0114] [0.0228] [0.0393]
Ln GDP per head
exporter
−0.173*** 0.111*** 0.217***
[0.0168] [0.0309] [0.0569]
Ln GDP per head
importer
−0.187*** −0.135*** −0.0556
[0.0155] [0.0318] [0.0551]
Ln area importer −0.0759*** −0.107*** −0.0891***
[0.00942] [0.0193] [0.0303]
Ln area exporter −0.0928*** −0.0721*** −0.0596**
[0.0102] [0.0155] [0.0296]
Importer is
landlocked
−0.802*** −0.874*** −0.930***
[0.0364] [0.0745] [0.150]
Exporter is
landlocked
−0.380*** −0.835*** −0.904***
[0.0373] [0.105] [0.174]
Ln geographical
distance
−1.246*** −1.267*** −1.620***
[0.0193] [0.0415] [0.0695]
Common border 1.208*** 1.586*** 1.023***
[0.0940] [0.223] [0.278]
Common language 0.669*** 0.620*** 0.309***
[0.0408] [0.0751] [0.115]
Common colonial
relationship
0.632*** 0.0542 −0.236
[0.0612] [0.0871] [0.124]
RTA 0.768*** 1.193*** 1.517***
[0.0382] [0.0877] [0.159]
WTO membership 0.188*** 0.307*** 0.148
[0.0306] [0.0700] [0.174]
Commonwealth
advantage
0.187*** 0.331***
[0.0641] [0.0835]
VA (exporter) 0.00619*** −0.0161*** −0.0182***
[0.000806] [0.00209] [0.00393]
VA (importer) 0.00643*** 0.00702*** 0.0115***
[0.000694] [0.00151] [0.00328]
PS (exporter) 0.0183*** 0.0118*** 0.0114***
[0.000909] [0.00211] [0.00394]
PS (importer) 0.00782*** 0.0115*** 0.0142***
[0.000790] [0.00174] [0.00362]
Governance
effectiveness
(exporter)
0.0245*** 0.0343*** 0.0282***
[0.00121] [0.00338] [0.00608]
Governance
effectiveness
(importer)
0.0124*** 0.0197*** 0.0154***
[0.00107] [0.00229] [0.00491]
RQ (exporter) 0.0190*** 0.0221*** 0.0154**
[0.00117] [0.00332] [0.00600]
RQ (importer) 0.0101*** 0.0132*** 0.00700
[0.00103] [0.00224] [0.00504]
RL (exporter) 0.0158*** 0.0181*** 0.0121***
[0.00105] [0.00264] [0.00466]
RL (importer) 0.0111*** 0.0205*** 0.0212***
[0.000939] [0.00209] [0.00428]
CC (exporter) 0.0117*** 0.0129*** 0.0102**
[0.000898] [0.00240] [0.00433]
CC (exporter) 0.00869*** 0.0160*** 0.0171***
[0.000840] [0.00182] [0.00375]
Time FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 245,375 62,227 18,179
R-squared 0.659 0.616 0.626
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered by ij. Period
1998–2013 in all columns.
***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1.
RTA constellation.4 Moreover, the RTA effect is
greater in magnitude than the trade effect of being
a WTO member. Trade between CW members is
more than three times higher when they belong
to an existing RTA, highlighting the importance
of effective regional integration for boosting the
CW advantage.
WTO membership indicates the strength of
global trade governance for a pair of countries.
Results show that, when the trading partners
belong to the WTO, they trade 20% more than
countries that are notWTOmembers. The same is
the case for CW exporters (column 2), for which
the WTO effect is over 30%.
The CW Advantage is positive and signifi-
cant. Results show that the CW pairs of coun-
tries trade 20% [(e0.0.18 –1)*100] more than any
other country pairs, keeping the other explana-
tory variables constant (column 1). In the second
column, when only CW exporters are considered,
the CW Advantage is even bigger—around 39%
[(e0.33 –1)*100]. This indicates that the CWcoun-
tries export almost 40% more to CW members
than to other countries, holding constant all the
other factors included in the gravity model—that
is, accounting for other factors affecting trade,
such as WTO membership, sharing a language,
or a border or colonial link.
The analysis of governance indicators shows
that the coefficients obtained in column 1 are
positive and significant for both exporter and
importer countries. The results in columns 2 and
3 show that, for CW exporters, the outcomes
differ when compared with column 1 for voice
and accountability, and a negative and signifi-
cant coefficient for an exporter, indicating that
an increase by 1 percentage point in the indica-
tor decreases exports by 1%. For the other five
indicators (political stability, governance effec-
tiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and con-
trol of corruption), the coefficients remain posi-
tive in column 2 and are in general higher than
in column 1, indicating that trade governance in
an exporter and an importer country has a greater
effect on exports for CW exporters. For example,
according to the results in column 3, an increase
4. We have also estimated the model with time invariant
origin and destination fixed effects in addition to time dum-
mies. The results indicate that the RTA effect is more mod-
erate, in line with expectations. Commonwealth exports to
their trading partners in RTAs is [exp(0.561)-1]*100 = 75%
higher than with other trading partners without common RTA;
whereas for intra-Commonwealth trade members of the same
RTA trade 224% more than the rest. The full results are avail-
able upon request. The results concerning governance vari-
ables remain practically unchanged.
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of 1 percentage point on governance effective-
ness in an exporter increases exports by 3.4%
(0.034*100) for a CWexporting country, whereas
the increase for any world exporter is 2.4%, hold-
ing all other factors constant.
All the CW developed countries have gov-
ernment effectiveness of above 90. However, for
most CW developing countries, improvements in
governance are gains in terms of higher exports.
Assuming that all CWdeveloping countries reach
the level of governance effectiveness (=70 in
2016) of Malaysia, this translates into an aver-
age increase in the index of around 26 percent-
age points. When we consider the corresponding
increase in the index for individual CW countries
(for which the index is below 70), this translates
into a predicted yearly average increase in exports
for the CW countries to all destinations of around
5.6%. This finding reiterates the importance of
government effectiveness in trade.
B. Foreign Direct Investment and Exports
Table 2 shows the results when the gravity
model, for the same sample of countries for
1996–2013, is augmented with FDI variables.
The results are for: All exporters, CW exporters,
and intra-CW trade, in columns 1, 2, and 3,
respectively. This does not present the coeffi-
cients for some gravity variables, including RTA,
WTO, and CW Advantage, given that these are
similar to what is reported in Table 1.
We expect a positive correlation between
inward and outward FDI stocks and trade. The
results (Table 2) indicate that an increase of 10%
in the stock of inward FDI in an exporter coun-
try is associated with a 3% increase in exports
(column 1). This increase is slightly lower for
CW exporters, at around 2.8%, and for intra-CW
exports, at 2.46%.
Further, higher levels of inward FDI leads to
an increase in importing countries’ exports, but
the elasticities are lower (0.19) for the whole
sample, when compared with the CW exporters
with an elasticity of 0.12.
Regarding outward FDI, higher outward FDI
is associated with higher exports. Note that the
magnitude of estimated elasticities is higher for
intra-CW exports (column 3) than for the whole
sample and for CW exporters as a group (see
columns 1 and 2, respectively).
Finally, neither inward nor outward FDI for
an importer country is statistically significant to
explain intra-CW exports.
C. Intellectual Property Rights and Exports
Table 3 shows results for the gravity model
augmented with IPR variables for 1996–2003.
The results are for: All exporters, CW exporters,
and intra-CW trade in columns 1, 2, and 3, respec-
tively. The coefficients of the other gravity vari-
ables, including RTA,WTO, and CWAdvantage,
are not presented, given that these are practically
the same as in Table 1.
The results indicate that higher payments
and receipts for the use of proprietary rights in
an exporter country (an importer) are positively
TABLE 2
Exports and FDI
All CW_EXP INTRA_CW
Dep. VAR: ln X (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exp. variables
Ln inward FDI (exporter) 0.307*** 0.281*** 0.246***
[0.0137] [0.0286] [0.0519]
Ln inward FDI (importer) 0.192*** 0.124*** 0.0377
[0.0129] [0.0268] [0.0516]
Ln outward FDI (exporter) 0.144*** 0.129*** 0.152***
[0.00923] [0.0184] [0.0359]
Ln outward FDI (exporter) 0.114*** 0.126*** 0.0534
[0.00881] [0.0180] [0.0342]
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 268,638 207,208 69,274 50,899 20,592 13,625
R-squared 0.670 0.684 0.623 0.634 0.632 0.650
Notes: The model includes the same regressors as in Table 1 apart from the WGIs, which are replaced by the FDI variables.
Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered by ij. Period 1996–2013 in all columns.
***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1.
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TABLE 3
Exports and IPRs
Dep. Var: ln X (1) (2) (3)
Exp. Variables All CW_EXP INTRA_CW
Ln IPR payments
(exporter)
0.0564*** 0.0157 0.0541*
[0.00909] [0.0186] [0.0281]
Ln IPR payments
(importer)
0.261*** 0.253*** 0.269***
[0.0108] [0.0187] [0.0310]
Ln IPR receipts
(exporter)
0.0527*** 0.104*** 0.110***
[0.00706] [0.0147] [0.0213]
Ln IPR receipts
(exporter)
0.0431*** 0.0576*** 0.0874***
[0.00866] [0.0148] [0.0245]
Ln patent
applications
(exporter)
0.111*** −0.0485 0.221***
[0.0135] [0.0289] [0.0726]
Ln patent
applications
(importer)
0.325*** 0.672*** 0.618***
[0.0141] [0.0338] [0.0631]
Ln trademark
(exporter)
0.153*** −0.0533 0.138*
[0.0143] [0.0297] [0.0733]
Ln trademark
(importer)
0.384*** 0.624*** 0.511***
[0.0174] [0.0390] [0.0726]
Time FE Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The model includes the same regressors as in
Table 1 apart from the WGIs, which are replaced by IPR
variables. Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered by ij.
Period 1996–2013 in all columns.
***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1.
correlated with exports in column 1, whereas
in columns 2 and 3 this is only for the
importer country.
Similar results are obtained for the number
of patents and trademark applications, suggesting
that higher innovation levels of the importing
country increase exports from the CW countries
and intra-CW trade.
D. Doing Business Indicators and Exports
Table 4 shows the results for the gravity
model augmented with contract enforcement
and trade facilitation variables for: All exporters,
CW exporters, and intra-CW trade, in columns
1, 2, and 3, respectively. As in previous cases,
the coefficients for other gravity variables are not
shown, since they are similar to in Table 1, with
the exception of the CW Advantage, which is
considerably higher when considering countries
with similar levels of trade facilitation.
The first trade facilitation variable considered
is the LPI score, which is positively correlated
with bilateral exports in columns 1–3, indicating
that an increase of 1% on the index is associated
with an increase of 1.7% in exports. The coef-
ficient is lower in column 2 for CW exporters
and slightly higher in 3 for intra-CW trade.
TABLE 4
Exports and Doing Business
Dep. Var: ln X (1) (2) (3)
Exp. Variables All CW_EXP INTRA_CW
Ln LPI 1.722*** 1.173*** 1.710***
[0.0600] [0.132] [0.304]
Ln days needed to
export
−0.478*** −0.669*** −0.220
[0.0605] [0.110] [0.252]
Ln days needed to
import
0.128*** 0.232*** −0.00298
[0.0455] [0.0744] [0.141]
Ln cost to export a
container
−0.483*** −0.490*** −0.355*
[0.0545] [0.106] [0.195]
Ln cost to import
a container
−0.0700 −0.239** −0.270
[0.0544] [0.0943] [0.186]
Ln documents
needed to
export
−0.425*** −0.436*** −1.228***
[0.0695] [0.132] [0.398]
Ln documents
needed to
import
−0.254*** −0.650*** −0.624**
[0.0629] [0.144] [0.263]
Ln days to enforce
a contract
(exporter)
−0.426*** −0.534*** −0.648***
[0.0422] [0.0800] [0.159]
Ln days to enforce
a contract
(importer)
−0.409*** −0.403*** −0.368**
[0.0432] [0.0800] [0.150]
Commonwealth
advantage
0.550*** 0.709***
[0.0806] [0.0965]
Note: The model includes the same regressors as in Table
1 apart from the WGIs, which are replaced by trade
facilitation variables. Robust standard errors in brackets,
clustered by country pair. Period 2007–2016.
***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1.
An increase in the index of 1% increases exports
more than proportionally, by 1.7% for intra-
CW trade.
With regard to number of days to export, the
coefficients are statistically significant and nega-
tive, indicating that a reduction in the number of
days needed to export will increase exports for
the whole sample and for CW exporters. How-
ever, the coefficient is not statistically significant
for intra-CW trade. The magnitude of the effect
is considerably higher for CW exporters (column
2), indicating that a reduction in the number of
days to export of 10%, equivalent to 2 days less
needed for the average exporter, increases exports
by 6.7% in CW exporters (column 2), but only by
4.8% in the whole sample (column 1).
The results for cost to export a container,
with the expected sign, indicate that a reduction
of 10% in the costs incurred for goods to exit
the country is associated with a 4.8% increase
in exports for the average exporter (4.9% for
CW exporters, column 2, and 3.5% for intra-CW
trade, column 3).
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Number of documents required to export has
the expected negative coefficient, in columns
1–3. The results indicate that fewer documents
required to export results in higher exports. The
negative coefficient, as expected in column 2 for
CW exporters, is slightly higher than in column 1,
but much higher for intra-CW in column 3. Thus,
if the number of documents required to export
is reduced to two (equivalent to a 20% reduc-
tion in CW countries), this will increase trade
by 24% [−1.228*20], whereas in the all coun-
tries case (column 1) the increase will be only
8.4% [−0.425*20], substantiating that reduced
document requirement enhances trade between
CW countries.
Important differences emerge for number of
days to enforce a contract. The elasticity is
−0.426 for all exporters (column 1) and −0.648
for intra-CW trade (column 3). The maximum
number of days needed to enforce a contract is
1,785 for the whole sample and 1,442 for the CW
countries, respectively. Thus, contract enforce-
ment is more efficient among CW members, in
general, and requires 20% less time compared to
the world average. If number of days to enforce
a contract is reduced to the minimum (which is
120 days in Singapore), the corresponding aver-
age number of days to enforce the contract for
all countries and CW countries is 651 and 619,
respectively. For intra-CW trade, total number of
days to enforce a contract reduces to 499. Such
a reduction will lead to higher exports for intra-
CW exporters, and as a result intra-CW exports
will increase by 6.4% for each 10% reduction in
the number of days to enforce a contract.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND THE WAY FORWARD
In this paper, we examined the interlinkage
between trade governance and bilateral trade
flows for CW exports within the 53 CW coun-
tries and to the rest of the world. The modeling
exercise applies the gravity model of trade to a
sample of countries over 1997–2016 using panel
data techniques. The main findings include: first,
contract enforcement is more efficient among
CW members, in general, and requires 20% less
time compared to the world average. Second, a
10% reduction in the costs incurred for a good to
exit a country can increase intra-CW exports by
5%. Third, every 1 percentage point improvement
in government effectiveness triggers a greater
increase in exports from CW traders, at 3.4%,
compared to the rest of the world, at 2.4%.
Finally, trade between CW members is more
than three times higher when they belong to
an existing RTA, highlighting the importance of
effective regional integration for boosting the
CW advantage.
Based on the results some important policy
implications can be derived to increase trade
between the CW countries. Given that an efficient
border management between CW countries and
robust contract enforcement for intra-CW trade
fosters participation in trade it is important to
initiate policy reforms (for trade liberalization)
complemented by improved domestic regulatory
governance to “unpack” the positive effects of
governance indicators to the fullest benefit of the
CW countries. Second, improving the availability
of trade-related information, simplifying and har-
monizing documents, streamlining procedures,
and using automated processes are important as
these reduce trade costs. The high-income CW
countries could support with capacity-building
initiatives through the establishment of new IPR
bodies, such as those that deal with the registra-
tion of patents, the granting of rights, rights man-
agement, and so on. In addition, efforts should
focus on the promotion of the second genera-
tion of multilateral treaties to ensure that IPR
regimes and sifter contract enforcement continue
to remain beneficial for CW exporters. Such pol-
icy reforms will allow the countries to reap the
CW advantage.
The overall analysis of interactions between
the governance indicators, as defined in the WGI
database, suggests a complementary relationship
between the quality of domestic governance and
exports. Results obtained are aligned with the
findings of previous studies in that our model
shows that distance has an expected negative (and
significant) effect on exports, unlike common
language, common border, and colonial links,
which affect exports positively. RTA and WTO
membership have a positive effect on exports,
with the former greater than the latter (see Yotov
et al. 2016 for an exhaustive discussion). How-
ever, the results suggest a negative (and signif-
icant) relationship with voice and accountabil-
ity, implying that an increase on this subindi-
cator affects exports adversely. For the remain-
ing WGIs (i.e., political stability, governance
effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and
control of corruption), trade governance affects
exports, especially for the CW exporters. These
results are in line with existing literature (see
Kaufmann and Kraay 2008).
Results for the model augmented with FDI
variables show a positive correlation between
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inward and outward FDI stocks and trade. On
the IPR–trade relationship, the results suggest
that higher payments and receipts from IPRs are
positively correlated with exports (see Moore
(2018) for a discussion). On trade facilitation and
contract enforcement, we find that a reduction
in the number of days and documents required
promotes trade, suggesting that improved cus-
toms administration promotes trade between CW
countries, this is in line with findings by Iwanov
and Kirkpatrick (2007) and Portugal-Perez and
Wilson (2012).
Possible directions for further research to
explore the realm of trade governance could
include how new technologies, and digitaliza-
tion could be utilized to improve logistics and
track trade flows in an efficient and transparent
manner. In particular, blockchain technologies
enable the identification and the tracking of
goods through the layers of the supply chain
and speed the process of identification of the
route ensuring anonymity. Such characteristics
enhance transparency and facilitate trade and,
hence, a new research area is to focus on eval-
uating the economics consequences in terms of
efficiency and cost savings from the ongoing
trade facilitation initiatives. Such examples of
trade facilitation include Singapore’s initiative to
adopt the exclusion of the certificates of origin
which is also being implemented in 15 African
countries. Such new areas will be the next step
forward in an era of trade and innovation.
APPENDIX
APPENDIX A: LIST OF COUNTRIES (COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES IN BOLD)
Afghanistan Dominica Lesotho Senegal
Albania Dominican Republic Liberia Seychelles
Algeria Ecuador Libya Sierra Leone
Angola Egypt Lithuania Singapore
Antigua and Barbuda El Salvador Madagascar Slovakia
Argentina Equatorial Guinea Malawi Slovenia
Armenia Eritrea Malaysia Solomon Islands
Australia Estonia Maldives Somalia
Austria Ethiopia Mali South Africa
Azerbaijan FS Micronesia Malta Spain
The Bahamas Faeroe Islands Marshall Islands Sri Lanka
Bahrain Fiji Mauritania Sudan
Bangladesh Finland Mauritius Suriname
Barbados France Mexico Swaziland
Belarus French Polynesia Mongolia Sweden
Belgium Gabon Morocco Switzerland
Belize The Gambia Mozambique Syria
Benin Georgia Myanmar TFYR of Macedonia
Bermuda Germany Namibia Tajikistan
Bhutan Ghana Nepal Thailand
Bolivia Greece Netherlands Togo
Bosnia Herzegovina Greenland New Caledonia Tonga
Botswana Grenada New Zealand Trinidad and Tobago
Brazil Guatemala Nicaragua Tunisia
Brunei Darussalam Guinea Niger Turkey
Bulgaria Guinea-Bissau Nigeria Turkmenistan
Burkina Faso Guyana Norway Turks and Caicos Islands
Burundi Haiti Oman Tuvalu
Cambodia Honduras Pakistan USA
Cameroon Hungary Palau Uganda
Canada Iceland Panama Ukraine
Cape Verde India Papua New Guinea United Arab Emirates
Cayman Islands Indonesia Paraguay United Kingdom
Central African Republic Iran Peru United Republic of Tanzania
Chad Iraq Philippines Uruguay
Chile Ireland Poland Uzbekistan
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APPENDIX A: Continued
Afghanistan Dominica Lesotho Senegal
China Israel Portugal Vanuatu
Colombia Italy Qatar Venezuela
Comoros Jamaica Republic of Korea Viet Nam
Congo Japan Republic of Moldova Yemen
Costa Rica Jordan Russian Federation Zambia
Croatia Kazakhstan Rwanda Zimbabwe
Cuba Kenya St Kitts and Nevis
Cyprus Kiribati Saint Lucia
Czech Republic Kuwait St Vincent and the Grenadines
Côte d’Ivoire Kyrgyzstan Samoa
DPR Korea Lao PDR San Marino
Denmark Latvia São Tomé and Príncipe
Djibouti Lebanon Saudi Arabia
APPENDIX B: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS
Variable Name Description Source
Ln GDP_exp Exporting country GDP at current prices WDI
Ln GDP_imp Importing country GDP at current prices
Ln pop_exp Population of exporting country in number of inhabitants
Ln pop_imp Population of importing country in number of inhabitants
Ln IPRp_exp (Ln IPRr_exp) IPR payments done by exporting country (receipts)
Ln IPRp_imp (Ln IPRr_imp) IPR payments done by importing country (receipts)
Ln pat_exp (imp) Number of patent applications in exporting (importing) country
Ln TM_exp (imp) Number of trademark applications
Ln DIST Distance between capital cities CEPII
Ln area_imp Area of importer
Ln area_exp Area of exporter
landlocked_imp Dummy variable takes value of 1 if importing country is landlocked
landlocked_exp Dummy variable takes value of 1 if exporting country is landlocked
CONTIG Dummy variable takes value of 1 if partner countries share a border
COMLANG Dummy variable takes value of 1 if partner countries share a common language
COLONY Dummy variable takes value of 1 if partner countries have ever had a colonial
relationship
WTO Takes the value of 1 if country i or country j is a WTO member and 2 if both are
members
De Sousa (2012)
RTA Dummy variable takes value of 1 if partner countries have an RTA
Ln LPI LPI World Bank
Ln iFDI_exp (Ln iFDI_imp) Inward FDI stock in exporting (importing) country UNCTAD
Ln oFDI_exp (Ln oFDI_imp) Outward FDI stock in exporting (importing) country
Ln daysx_exp Days for exports for exporting country World Bank Doing
Ln daysm_imp Days for imports for importing country Business
Ln docx_exp Number of documents for exports for exporting country
Ln docm_imp Number of documents for imports for importing country
Ln costxusd_exp Costs to export (in U.S. dollars) for exporting country
Ln costmusd_imp Costs to import (in U.S. dollars) for importing country
Ln enforc_imp Number of days needed to enforce contract in importing country
Ln enforc_exp Number of days needed to enforce contract in exporting country
VAstd_exp Exporting country’s standardized value (0–100) of VA World Bank WGI
PSstd_exp Exporting country’s standardized value (0–100) of PS
GEstd_exp Exporting country’s standardized value (0–100) of GE
RQstd_exp Exporting country’s standardized value (0–100) of RQ
RLstd_exp Exporting country’s standardized value (0–100) of RL
CCstd_exp Exporting country’s standardized value (0–100) of CC
VAstd_imp Importing country’s standardized value (0–100) of VA
PSstd_imp Importing country’s standardized value (0–100) of PS
GEstd_imp Importing country’s standardized value (0–100) of GE
RQstd_imp Importing country’s standardized value (0–100) of RQ
RLstd_imp Importing country’s standardized value (0–100) of RL
CCstd_imp Importing country’s standardized value (0–100) of CC
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APPENDIX C: SUMMARY STATISTICS
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
lnX 303,515 14.881 3.879 0 26.634
lnGDP_exp 601,209 23.567 2.472 16.328 30.451
lnGDP_imp 597,080 23.523 2.484 16.328 30.451
lnPCGDP_exp 601,209 8.081 1.605 4.284 11.541
lnPCGDP_imp 597,080 8.082 1.603 4.284 11.541
larea_imp 625,968 11.306 2.675 3.401 16.654
larea_exp 625,968 11.373 2.614 3.401 16.654
landlocked_imp 625,968 0.185 0.388 0 1
landlocked_exp 625,968 0.185 0.388 0 1
lnDIST_ij 625,968 8.757 0.827 0.651 9.899
CONTIG_ij 625,968 0.015 0.123 0 1
COMLANG_ij 625,968 0.158 0.364 0 1
COLONY_ij 625,968 0.117 0.322 0 1
RTA 625,968 0.089 0.285 0 1
WTO 653,484 0.536 0.499 0 1
VAstd_exp 527,929 55.344 25.543 0 100
PSstd_exp 488,785 61.909 22.263 0 100
GEstd_exp 524,119 49.592 22.020 0 100
RQstd_exp 524,313 55.067 21.875 0 100
RLstd_exp 527,929 53.261 23.121 0 100
CCstd_exp 524,119 41.388 23.695 0 100
lnifdist_exp 579,852 8.391 2.623 −1.347 15.415
lnifdist_imp 589,982 8.385 2.605 −1.347 15.415
lnofdist_exp 459,837 6.854 3.628 −4.605 15.649
lnofdist_imp 466,125 6.807 3.647 −4.605 15.649
lnIPRp_exp 404,407 17.307 3.328 −0.991 24.561
lnIPRp_imp 413,778 17.312 3.328 −0.991 24.561
lnIPRr_exp 308,557 16.340 3.786 4.804 25.576
lnIPRr_imp 315,899 16.344 3.786 4.804 25.576
lnpat_exp 307,704 7.064 2.273 1.099 13.623
lnpat_imp 311,585 7.059 2.282 1.099 13.623
lnTM_exp 420,149 8.677 1.781 0 14.430
lnTM_imp 420,658 8.703 1.787 0 14.430
llpi 157,620 −1.566 0.459 −5.389 −0.131
lndaysx_exp 138,276 2.849 0.493 1.792 4.625
lncostx_exp 138,276 6.890 0.395 5.966 8.269
lnndoc_exp 186,830 1.707 0.333 0.693 2.639
lnenforc_exp 200,018 6.386 0.425 4.787 7.487
Note: The definition of variables is provided in Appendix B. For the governance indicators and the trade facilitation variables,
only the summary statistics for the exporting countries are provided. Those coincide with the corresponding values for the
importing countries, since there are no missing data for these indicators.
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